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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Vagueness - The Crippler Of Loyalty Oaths
Baggett v. Bullitt1
Members of the faculty, staff, and student body of the University
of Washington instituted a class action, challenging the validity of
two loyalty oaths required of teachers and other employees of the
university. The first oath, required of faculty members only, incor-
porated various provisions of 1931 legislation which demanded that
the signer swear to support the constitution and laws of both the
United States and the State of Washington and to promote respect
for their flags and institutions.2 The second part of the oath dealt with
subversive activities. This section embodied the requirements of 1951
legislation, which generally provided that no "subversive person" as
defined in this Act could be eligible to hold any position as a state
employee.' The second oath, established in 1955, was applicable to all
state employees and was incorporated as the second part of the oath
required of faculty members.'
The district court decided that the oath requirements of the 1955
Act and the statutory provisions upon which it was based were not
unconstitutionally vague and did not contravene any of the freedoms
guaranteed by either the first or fourteenth amendments. The court
abstained from ruling on the claim that the 1931 legislation was vague,
favoring the possibility that a state proceeding might resolve the
constitutional issue.'
The Supreme Court confined its consideration to the question of
vagueness, which it found dispositive of the case. In dealing with the
1951 legislation, which was the basis for the oath established in 1955,
the Court found that the portion concerned with the definition of a
1. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
2. Wash. Laws 1931, ch. 103 (full text of Act).
"I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution and laws
of the United States of America and of the State of Washington, and will by
precept and example promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United
States of America and the State of Washington, reverence for law and order and
undivided allegiance to the government of the United States." Wash. Laws 1931,
ch. 103, § 1, at 295.
3. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.81.060 (1961), Definition given infra.
4. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
"I certify that I have read the provisions of RCW 9.81.010(2), (3), and (5)
RCW 9.81.060; RCW 9.81.070; and RCW 9.81.083 which are printed on the
reverse hereof; that I understand and am familiar with the contents thereof; that
I am not a subversive person as therein defined; and
"I do solemly swear (or affirm) that I am not a member of the Communist
party or knowingly of any other subversive organization.
"I understand that this statement and oath are made subject to the penalties
of perjury." Id. at 364-65 n.3.
This above provision is the only oath taken by state employees other than teachers,
and it is also incorporated into the original oath taken by teachers as the last section
thereof. Thus in effect all state employees are subject to the oath provisions dealing
with subversive activities. Wash. Laws 1955, ch. 377.
5. The 1955 act had been attacked in the Washington State courts and its validity
had been upheld. One section of the act was held unconstitutional, but severable from
the rest of the act. Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wash. 2d 460, 335 P.2d 10 (1959).
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"subversive person" was vague. The term "subversive person" was
defined as follows:
" 'Subversive person' means any person who commits, attempts
to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises
or teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit,
or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy
or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of,
the constitutional form of the government of the United States, or
of the state of Washington, or any political subdivision of either
of them by revolution, force, or violence; or who with knowledge
that the organization is an organization as described in subsec-
tions (2) and (3) hereof, becomes or remains a member of a sub-
versive organization or a foreign subversive organization."'
The Court felt that the wording of the oath was too vague for a teacher
or other employee of the state to be able conscientiously to sign it and
be sure of what he was permitted or forbidden to do. Mr. Justice White
warned of some of these dangers by stating:
"A person is subversive not only if he himself commits the specified
acts but if he abets or advises another in aiding a third person
to commit an act which will assist yet a fourth person in the over-
throw or alteration of constitutional government."7
The Court also found that the 1931 legislation was unconstitution-
ally vague.8
Loyalty oaths seem to appear whenever fear and suspicion pervade
the atmosphere. They appeared in abundance in this country during
the intense period of adjustment following the Civil War. In 1865,
Missouri adopted a new constitution which required an oath of past
loyalty to the United States from those wishing to teach, vote, or
hold office.9 A similar law was enacted by Congress for those wishing
to practice law in the federal courts.' 0 In Cummings v. Missouri"1
and Ex Parte Garland,'2 the Supreme Court struck down these laws
6. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.81.010(5) (1961).
7. 377 U.S. 360, 369 (1964).
8. In dealing with the 1931 legislation the Court was faced with the problem of
abstention because the 1931 act had never been interpreted by the state courts of
Washington. The Supreme Court, however, felt that a state construction of the oath
would do very little in the way of eliminating its infirmities and remanding the case
would merely protract the litigation. For an analysis of the Court's use of vagueness
in its decision-making process, see, Amsterdam, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
9. Mo. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 6 (1865).
10. 13 Stat. 424 (1865).
11. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). For a discussion of this case, see HYMAN, ERA
OF THE OATH: NORTHERN LOYALTY TESTs DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RgCONSTRUC-
TION (1954).
12. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). See Russ, Jr., The Lawyer's Test Oath
During Reconstruction, 10 Miss. L.J. 154 (1938). For more modern cases dealing
with the loyalty requirements of lawyers before they are admitted to the bar, see
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) and Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) ; 1 EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 480-502 (2d ed. 1958).
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as being ex post facto and bills of attainder. Although subversive
statutes were, as might be expected, widespread during the Red Scare
of the 20's, loyalty oaths were curiously absent. They reappeared in
abundance, however, during the post World War II period and flowered
in the "Age of McCarthy."
The restraints these oaths placed on the freedoms of speech and
association brought forth a challenge to their constitutionality. In 1951,
Garner v. Board of Public Works" reached the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of a Los Angeles
loyalty oath, held that a municipal employer had the right to satisfy
itself as to the loyalty and trustworthiness of its employees. Justice
Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, expressed the feelings of the
Court on this point by stating: "The Constitution does not guarantee
public employment. City, State and Nation ... may . .. assure them-
selves of fidelity to the very presuppositions of our scheme of govern-
ment on the part of those who seek to serve it."' 4 Thus Garner has
made it clear that loyalty oaths are not, at least at present, uncon-
stitutional per se.
Loyalty oaths are, however, still subject to limitations imposed
by the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments. One of these limita-
tions deals with the problem of scienter. 5 The Supreme Court has
held that scienter or knowledge is a necessary ingredient in a loyalty
oath case."6 A person may not be denied a job for membership in an
organization unless he has knowledge of the forbidden purposes or
activities of the association. Scienter was held to be implicit in the
loyalty oath in the Garner case, but in a later case "whe re scienter was
found not to be required, the Court invalidated the oath and the state's
procedure in administering it. The Court said in essence that one
cannot be charged with forbidden activities when he has no knowledge
of the evil purposes of the organization.'
Though loyalty oaths have been attacked for abridging free speech
and due process,' they have been most vigorously challenged on the
ground of unconstitutional vagueness. The question of vagueness of
a loyalty oath involves the problems of fair notice and clear expression.
In American Communications Association v. Douds, ° the clarity of
section 9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 194721 was at-
tacked. Under section 9 (h), the facilities of the Labor Relations Board
were not available to any labor organization whose officers did not
13. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
14. Id. at 724-25.
15. "Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an
assertion of arbitrary power." Wieman v. Updergraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
16. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
17. Wieman v. Updergraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
18. Supra note 17, at 190-91.
19. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) and First Unitarian Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958). See also Parker v. County of Los
Angeles, 338 U.S. 327 (1949), in which an oath was attacked on due process claims,
but certiorari was dismissed for lack of ripeness.
20. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). For a review of this case see Barnett, The Constitu-
tionality of the Expurgatory Oath Requirement of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, 27 OR. L. RXv. 85 (1949).
21. 49 Stat. 453 (1947).
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sign an affidavit that they were not Communists and were not mem-
bers of any organization that believed in or taught the overthrow of
the government by force or other methods. In upholding this clause,
the Court stated that it dealt only with the "objective of overthrow
by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods ... , The
Court felt this was a sufficiently clear delineation of the activity which
the statute forbade. The Court also adopted a standard that could be
used in determining whether a statute was vague or not. "The appli-
cable standard, however, is not one of wholly consistent academic
definition of abstract terms. It is, rather, the practical criterion of fair
notice to those to whom the statute is directed. The particular context
is all important. 2 3
The Feinberg Law of New York, which establishes the criterion
for elimination of subversive persons from the school system, was
attacked in Adler v. Board of Education.2 This act, which involved
not a loyalty oath but the definition of what constituted a subversive
person for purpose of removal, was attacked on vagueness grounds in
the same manner as if it were an oath. The act defined a "subversive
organization" as an organization that advocates the overthrow of the
government by force or violence.25 This definition was sustained as
being sufficiently clear and definite so as not to violate due process.
Douds and Adler, both dealing with the question of the vague-
ness of subversive activity provisions, reached the same result as to
what may be forbidden and the terms that must be used. Thus organi-
zations or persons that "advocate the overthrow of the government
by force or violence" can be restricted in their activity, and restrictions
framed in such terms are not vague and unconstitutional. The term
"susceptible of objective measurement ' 2 6 is the standard used by the
Court in the Washington Loyalty Oath case, and Douds and Adler
seem to meet this criterion.
In contrast to Douds and Adler is the case of Cramp v. Board of
Public Instruction27 decided in 1961. In that case, a Florida loyalty
oath 28 which required a teacher to swear that he had never lent his
"aid, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party" was in-
validated. A close scrutiny of the actions prohibited indicates their
indefiniteness. There is no concrete formulation of what "aid, advice,
counsel or influence" can include within their meaning. Normally
innocent activities may become forbidden activities under a literal
interpretation of these words. The oath, speculative as to what is
prohibited, suffers with the vice of vagueness. Unlike the forbidden
activity in Douds, there is little concreteness and little chance of "objec-
tive measurement." Thus it can be reasoned that future statutes of the
type found in the principal case and in Cramp, which leave too much
22. 339 U.S. at 407-08.
23. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950).
24. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
25. N.Y. Education Law § 3022 (McKinney's Consol. Laws ch. 16).
26. 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964).
27. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 876, § 876.05 (Supp. 1964).
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to the imagination, and give too little in the way of fair notice, will be
invalidated for vagueness.29
The principal case is important in Maryland because of the simi-
larity of Maryland's loyalty oath to the Washington oath. The Sedition
and Subversive Activities Law of 1949,30 generally known as the
Ober Law, requires that all state employees and candidates for office
must sign a loyalty oath. The oath states:
"I do hereby certify that I am not a subversive person as
defined by law, namely that I am not a person engaged in one
way or another in an attempt to overthrow the government of the
United States, or of the State of Maryland, or any political sub-
division of either of them, by force or violence, and I am not know-
ingly a member of an organization engaged in such an attempt.
31
The validity of the oath was challenged in Shub v. Simpson 32 by
candidates for local and federal office on the grounds that it was an
extra oath of office, which is forbidden by the Maryland Constitution,
and that it was vague. The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the
oath, and proclaimed that its purpose was, 33 "to prevent infiltration
in our state, county, or municipal governments of persons who are
engaged in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the govern-
ment by force or violence."
'34
In 1951, in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections,3" the
oath was once again attacked and upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Appealed to the Supreme Court,36 the judgment was affirmed on the
stipulation that the actual oath to be applied would only require one
to swear that he was not a person who was engaged "in 'one way or
another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or
violence' and that he is not knowingly a member of an organization
engaged in such an attempt.1
3 7
After the decision in Baggett, Attorney General Finan defended
the constitutionality of the Maryland oath. In a press release, he stated,
"This oath has been specifically upheld against attack on constitutional
vagueness grounds by both the Maryland Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Gerende case. "38
The main point of controversy concerning Maryland's oath is
that the definition of a "subversive person" as defined in the Ober
29. Mr. Justice White in the principal case pointed out the need for fair notice in
loyalty oaths. "It is not the penalty itself that is invalid, but the exaction of obedience
to a rule or standard that is so vague and indefinite as to be really no rule or standard
at all." 377 U.S. at 374, quoting Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commissioners of
Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932).
30. 8A MD. CODE ANN. art. 85a (1957).
31. This is the oath required of state employees, but local subdivisions within the
state use other oaths. Attorney General Finan's Press Release (June 8, 1964).
32. 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (1950).
33. For a contrary view on the question of the construction of the oath as an
additional oath of office, see Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578, 71 A.2d 352 (1950), 18
A.L.R.2d 241, 268 (1951).
34. Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 192, 76 A.2d 332, 338 (1950).
35. 197 Md. 282, 78 A.2d 660 (1951).
36. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Balto., 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
37. Id. at 56-57.
38. Attorney General Finan's Press Release, p. 3 (June 8, 1964).
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Law, 9 is virtually identical with the definition ruled invalid in the
principal case. However, there is one salient difference between the
two oaths. This is the fact that the definition of a "subversive person"
is not included in the Maryland oath while it was written on the back
of the Washington oath and thus became incorporated into it. How-
ever, the Maryland oath does require that the signer swear that he is
not a "subversive person as defined by law," which would seem to
refer to the invalid definition contained in the Ober law. This refer-
ence is counterbalanced by the definition of a subversive person, which
is in the oath itself. On balance it would seem. the Maryland oath
has followed the Supreme Court's decision in the Gerende case as to
what would be allowed in the oath. Maryland's oath being in con-
formity with what has previously been held valid in other cases, plus
the Supreme Court's earlier ruling in its favor, lends support to the
belief that the oath remains constitutional.4
However irreproachable the constitutionality of a loyalty oath,
its value may be seriously questioned. Two arguments are usually
advanced in favor of the oath. One is that a loyalty oath is an effective
device for keeping subversives out of the government. This is an illusion.
"After one year of operation, the loyalty oath required of Detroit's
municipal employees had claimed a single casualty - a member
of the sect of Jehovah's Witnesses. The first effect of the Ober
Act in Maryland was to scare three Quakers whose religious
rather than political dogmas prevented their conscientious com-
pliance with the statute. In California a number of academies lost
their appointments because they were unwilling to assert their
innocence of Communism, even though nobody as much as hinted
that they were in fact guilty. In short, the bag has been a dis-
appointing one."'"
The other argument is "Why not ?" Why should any loyal Ameri-
can object to swearing that he does not advocate the forcible overthrow
of the government and that he is not and will not become a member
of any organization so advocating? In response Alan Barth has said,
"A prior and more apposite question is 'Why?' Why should public
employees 'be singled out as a special class and be asked to profess their
39. 8A MD. CODe ANN. art. 85a, § 13 (1957) :
"Every person, who on June 1, 1949 shall be in the employ of the State of
Maryland or of any political subdivision thereof, other than those now holding
elective office shall be required on or before August 1, 1949, to make a written
statement which shall contain notice that it is subject to the penalties of perjury,
that he or she is not a subversive person as defined in this article, namely, any
person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates,
abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit,
or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to
assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of
the government of the United States, or of the State of Maryland, or any political
subdivision of either of them, by resolution, force, or violence; or who is a member
of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization, as more fully
defined in this article."
40. On June 24, 1964, Joseph Allen, Baltimore City Solicitor, ruled that Baltimore
City's oath was invalid under the ruling in the Baggett decision, and that the state
oath would be used from now on. The Evening Sun (Baltimore) June 24, 1964, p. 26.
41. GFLLHORN, THX STAT4S AND SuBvr*RSION 367-68 (1952).
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innocence of an attitude which there is no good reason to suspect them
of holding'.1 42 On the other hand, the shortcomings of an oath require-
ment are overwhelming.
"(1) it is not an effective means for accomplishing its objective
of uprooting Communists and other subversives from public
employment;
"(2) it deprives the public of the services of able persons of con-
science who are unwilling to take the oath;
"(3) it causes understandable resentment on the part of those who
are singled out to swear to their loyalty but also oppose being
pushed around; and
"(4) in questioning the loyalty of a sizable group of citizens, it
creates an atmosphere of suspicion which is neither healthy
nor traditional in democratic societies."43
The Maryland oath, as well as all other loyalty oaths, is subject
to these shortcomings. Even though a loyalty oath may not infringe
upon constitutionally protected speech and association, or be unconsti-
tutionally vague, the fact remains that its value is highly questionable.
Stanley J. Neuhauser
42. BARTH, THE LOYALTY Oiv FRzE MEN 288 (Cardinal ed. 1952).
43. Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Oath, 101 U. PA. L. Rev. 480,
486 (1953).
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